This paper investigates the impact of bank competition in Sub-Saharan Africa on bank non-performing loans, a measure of credit risk. Using bank-level data for a sample of 221 banks from 33 countries over the period 2000-15, we find a non-linear or U-shaped relationship between bank competition and credit risk. In other words, increased bank competition has the potential to lower credit risk via efficiency gains (lower credit cost, operational gains). However, the positive effects may be outweighed by adverse effects of excessive competition (lower profit margins, increased risk incentives). We also find that credit risk in Sub-Saharan Africa is not only related to macroeconomic determinants, such as growth, public debt, economic concentration, financial deepening and inclusion, but also to the business and regulatory environment. These results may provide useful insights on how to design and adapt prudential and regulatory frameworks to the specific needs in developing countries.
Introduction
Banking sectors in Sub-Saharan Africa have been growing rapidly during the last two decades in the wake of the super-cycle of commodity prices and high growth on the continent. Regional A growing strand of theoretical and empirical research highlights the importance of financial deepening and inclusion to support economic growth in Sub-Saharan African countries (Chauvet and Jacolin, 2017; Leon, 2015a; Ncube, 2007) . In such countries characterized by high levels of economic growth, the reliance on banking sectors to ensure adequate financing is increasing, however, at the same time there are high risks of macroeconomic instability which often arises from external shocks.
In this context, the linkages between growing competition in SSA banking sectors and credit risk have become salient. Even if banking systems remain weak and isolated in SSA (Marchettini and Maino, 2015) , banking crises arising from financial development and credit booms may become an increasing source of concern for regulatory and supervisory authorities, to the extent that the interactions between credit and economic cycles become stronger, similarly to the trends observed in the advanced economies. 3 The relationship between bank competition and credit risk is less than straightforward. Bank competition might arguably spur efficiency gains (through, for example, lower credit costs, improved operational and risk management practices, or better allocation of capital), and it thus might contribute to higher potential growth and translate into sounder credit portfolios. However, it might also encourage additional risk taking by financial intermediaries, making banks more fragile in the face of economic fluctuations and deterioration in the quality of credit books.
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Shedding light on the bank competition/credit risk nexus, a large body of theoretical and empirical literature produced mixed conclusions (Keeley, 1990; Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005; Martinez-Mierra and Repullo, 2010; Salas and Saurina, 2003; Fungáčová and Weill, 2013; Beck et al., 2006; Jiménez et al., 2013) .
In addition to extending the focus on the recent experience in Sub-Saharan Africa, the main contribution of our research is to provide new empirical insight on how bank competition has affected credit risk in SSA countries, controlling for macroeconomic determinants, bank-specific characteristics, and the regulatory environment. Our study also seeks to contribute to the ongoing discussion about whether and to what extent regulatory and policy design should be adapted to the determinants of credit risk that are specific to developing countries.
Using data on the financial statements of 221 banks (of which 140 are foreignowned) from 33 countries in SSA over the period 2000-15, we find evidence that the relationship between non-performing loans and bank competition, as measured by market power, is non-linear and U-shaped, suggesting that beyond a certain threshold the efficiency gains of more bank competition may be outweighed by 1 As Brock and Rojaz Suarez (2000) argue in the case of the Latin American experience, regulators overly permissive attitude towards the entry of new banks can pose a threat to financial system stability, especially, when many or large entrants compete aggressively with the existing banks for costumers by lowering loan rates and increasing deposit rates to levels that are unsustainable. 4 financial instability effects. Our study also highlights the importance of macroeconomic variables in determining credit risks, such as growth, financial deepening and economic concentration, as well as bank portfolios and the regulatory environment. More specifically, we find that credit risks have been lower in countries where there operate more branches, credit registry coverage is higher, and the tenure of supervisors is shorter. Finally, we show that public indebtedness has an impact on bank credit risk in these countries, where government and public enterprises make up a significant portion of the formal economy.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an extensive review of the related literature. Section 3 discusses and reports summary statistics for the sample data. Section 4 describes the empirical model and discusses the definitions of the variables selected in parameterizing the empirical model. The empirical results are reported in Section 5, and Section 6 discusses the robustness checks. The final section concludes.
Literature review on bank competition and stability

Competition-fragility versus competition-stability
The theoretical literature provides conflicting predictions on the relationship between competition and stability (Beck, 2008) . One strand of the literature suggests that less competitive banking systems are more stable. A central argument is that higher interest revenues (or oligopoly rents) provide banks a cushion against unexpected shocks and reduce incentives for risk-taking (Marcus, 1984; Keeley, 1990) . In systems with limited competition, banks tend to have better profit opportunities, higher franchise values and capital cushions, and thus fewer incentives to take on risks. Another argument is that banks in more competitive systems earn less informational rents from relationship lending, which reduces their screening incentives and results in riskier loan books (Boot et al., 1993; Allen and Gale, 2000, 5 2004).
2 In addition, Allen and Gale (2000) argue that competition can lead to instability in the interbank bank market and payment system, as banks might be unwilling to provide funds to liquidity-constrained competitors. Hellmann et al. (2000) show that competition in the deposit market can lead to instability. Moreover, to the extent that less competitive markets are associated with fewer but larger banks, benefits could arise from economies of scale and diversification (Diamond, 1984) and improved ability of regulators to supervise the banking system (Allen and Gale, 2000). The aforementioned theories thus provide arguments in favour of the 'competition-fragility' (or franchise value) view and predict that competition will lead to more fragile banking systems.
In contrast, other theoretical models predict that more competitive banking systems are more stable. For instance, Boyd and de Nicolo (2005) , who introduce in their model loan market competition, argue that higher loan rates in more concentrated systems induce bank borrowers to assume greater risk which results in increased loan defaults. This effect can be amplified if less competition is associated with less credit rationing, adverse selection and larger loans (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Caminal and Matutes, 2002) . Other models suggest that less competitive environments with larger banks increase incentive distortions linked to implicit government guarantees and other too-big-to-fail subsidies (Mishkin, 1999; Cerasi and Daltung, 2000; Fahri and Tirole, 2012) . Systems with fewer and larger banks might also be more interconnected and lead to higher systemic risk (Kroszner, 2010) . These arguments would thus favour the 'competition-stability' view according to which competition is associated with more stable banking systems.
2 Theory and empirical work suggest that market power entices banks to invest in long-term and softinformation-based relationships with small and opaque firms as they know that they can regain the initial investment in the relationship at a later stage (Peterson and Rajan, 1995; Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell'Aricca, 2004 ).
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Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) extend the model of Boyd and de Nicolo (2005) and introduce imperfect correlation of loan defaults. Their model implies a U-shaped relationship between bank competition and bank failure: at the beginning, more competition leads to more stability but after a certain threshold it can lead to more fragility. The authors highlight two opposing effects of competition: (i) it leads to lower loan rates, lower borrower default probabilities, and thus sounder loan books (risk-shifting effect), and (ii) lower interest revenues from performing loans erode bank cushions stemming from revenues (margin effect) and have an adverse effect on bank stability. The model implies that beyond a certain threshold of competition the risk-shifting effect is always dominated by the margin effect, so competition leads to more fragility by eroding interest revenues. Below this threshold with less competition the effect is ambiguous but numerical simulations suggest that the riskshifting effect dominates and that competition leads to more stability by improving borrowers' repayment capacity.
Theoretical work has also been conducted on the impact of competition on different aspects of financial stability and the role of the liability structure of banks (Freixas and Ma, 2014) . While in a classical originate-to-hold banking industry competition might increase financial stability, the opposite can be true for an originate-todistribute banking industry in which banks are funded by a larger fraction of market short-term funding. Moreover, it has been highlighted that regulatory and institutional factors play an important role in determining bank responses to competition. Capital requirements and restrictions on interest rates and bank activities are seen as fostering stability (Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz, 2000) , but they might as well lead to rent-seeking and prevent banks from gaining diversification and scale benefits. The role of deposit insurance schemes has also been debated. While deposit insurance serves to protect depositors and prevent 7 bank runs, it might as well increase banks' risk-taking incentives (Diamond and Dybvik, 1983) . Other regulatory measures that have been highlighted in this context include entry requirements, barriers to entry for domestic and foreign banks, and other restrictions that might prevent new entrants from challenging incumbents (Beck, 2008) .
Empirical studies generally find ambiguous results (see Zigraiova and Havranek (2016) for a meta-analysis). In favour of the competition-fragility view are the results reported by Keeley (1990) and Dick (2006) for the United States, Yeyati and Micco (2007) for Latin America, Jiménez et al. (2013) Tabak et al. (2012) find for Latin America that high/low competition is associated with more stability, whereas the average competition displays the highest fragility. As they argue, capital is the stabilizing factor in less competitive environments and bank size in more competitive markets. Using data on 10 European countries, Liu et al. (2013) highlight that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between regional bank competition and stability. This result suggests that a moderate level of bank competition is associated with higher stability. Otero Gonzalez et al. (2017) provide evidence of a Ushaped relationship between competition and bank risk-taking for MENA countries.
For Gulf countries, the authors provide evidence that an increase in competition leads to a reduction in financial stability, whereas in the case of non-Gulf countries, an increase of competition in uncompetitive markets can lead to more stability.
Other determinants of credit risk
A large body of studies focusses on the impact of the macroeconomic environment, bank characteristics and the regulatory framework on credit risk. The theoretical literature highlights the business cycle itself as a systematic factor influencing bank losses (Carey, 1998; Ruckes, 2004) . By increasing the net present value of investments and borrowers' repayment capacity, improved macroeconomic conditions tend to reduce the risk of loan defaults. A number of empirical studies 3 confirms this view by establishing a negative relationship between non-performing loans and economic growth in advanced economies, along with employment (Nkusu, 2011; Castro, 2013) .
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Other research has emphasized the role of bank-specific characteristics in explaining non-performing loans. For instance, Salas and Saurina (2002) Other research has addressed the relationship between the regulatory framework and credit risk (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002; Barth et al., 2004; Fernandez and 10 Gonzalez, 2005; Houston et al. (2010) ; Klomp and de Haan, 2012; Chen et al., 2017) .
For instance, Barth et al. (2004) and Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005) show that private monitoring reduces credit risks by increasing market discipline. Klomp and de Haan (2012) The second challenge relates to the measurement of risk which can be measured indirectly for individual banks or the entire system. 5 A commonly used measure of individual bank risk is the non-performing loan ratio which only covers the credit risk of a bank's overall risk profile (Beck, 2008) . Even though bank failures and credit risks are typically highly correlated, especially in small and retail-oriented banking systems, banks might hedge credit risks through diversified asset portfolios or set aside capital to cope with eventual credit defaults. Other studies have used the ZScore or distance-to-default (Boyd and Runkle, 1993; Lepetit et al., 2008; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Čihák and Hesse, 2010) . Even though the Z-Score is a measure of a bank's overall risk, its empirical implementation is challenging as the standard deviation of the return on assets is often estimated by a rolling-window with small sample sizes in large panel settings. To the extent that similar concerns apply to our data on African banks, we decided to use the non-performing loan ratio but check for robustness using other measures of bank risk (such as impaired loan reserves and the Z-Score). And finally, the estimations may be subject to endogeneity as prices, profitability, risk and concentration are jointly determined (Bresnahan, 1989; Berger et al., 2004) . As a result, we have to use instruments for our concentration measure and the other bank-specific characteristics in the econometric investigation.
Data description
We obtain bank-level data on financial statements from Fitch Connect over the period 2000-15. Our initial sample covers 526 financial institutions located in 37 Sub-Saharan Africa countries. Where possible, we gather consolidated financial statements of banks making the assumption that banks manage the entire set of assets on a consolidated basis. If no consolidated statement exists, we use the unconsolidated financial statement. Our study focuses on the credit risk of deposittaking institutions and as consequence, we exclude non-deposit-taking institutions from the sample. 6 Further, we eliminate banks and countries from the study for which we were unable to obtain relevant information to compute non-performing loans 7 or the macroeconomic and regulatory variables to parameterise the empirical model. After applying our filters, the final sample covers 221 deposit-taking institutions from 33 Sub-Saharan African countries. Table 1 reports the list and summary information for the sampled countries. As can be seen, total assets of the banks amounted to 310 billion USD at the end of 2015,
corresponding to an average of 21.5 percent of GDP (or 72% of the entire SSA banking sector). 9 The lowest asset-to-GDP ratios are observed in Gabon, Equatorial
Guinea, Chad and Democratic Republic of the Congo (below 5%), whereas in Cape Verde and Kenya bank assets amounted to more than 65% of GDP. These figures clearly point to the fact that the banking sectors in the region are still in the early stage of development and that financial deepening is low. Banks in the region faced 6 We cross-referenced the list of financial institutions obtained from Fitch Connect with the registry of licensed banking entities reported on the websites of the various central banks in the region in order to distinguish between deposit-taking entities from the other types of financial firms. 7 Some banks do not publicly disclose certain balance sheet items including impaired loans.
a much higher fraction of non-performing loans compared to advanced economies (see Figure 1 ). On average, 8.4% of loans have become non-performing in SSA (compared to 1.8% in the advanced economies) over the entire sample period, even though there is important cross-country variation (see also Table 1 
Econometric framework
Baseline model
To examine the determinants of credit risks, we use a dynamic panel regression. The baseline model is specified as follows:
where denotes the non-performing loan ratio of bank i located in country j in year t, represents the bank competition indicator, is a vector of bankspecific characteristics, and and denote the vectors of macroeconomic and other (structural and institutional) control variables. We also include bank fixedeffects to account for time-invariant and unobserved differences in the loan quality across banks. The model is estimated in dynamic form by including a lagged value of non-performing loans to capture the persistence of credit risk over time (Salas and Saurina, 2002; Louzis et al., 2012; Jiménez et al., 2013 ).
14 The non-performing loan ratio is measured by impaired loans as a proportion of total loans. The vector includes a set of bank-specific indicators that have been highlighted in the empirical literature as important drivers of credit risk, notably the net interest margins (net interest income divided by total assets), the loan-to-assets ratio, income diversification (non-interest income divided by total assets), capitalization (total equity divided by total assets), and bank size (logarithm of total assets). We instrument all these variables by their lagged values in order to mitigate any possible endogeneity problem, we may have in our model specification (Roodman, 2009) .
To capture a possible non-linear relationship between bank competition and nonperforming loans, we augment our baseline model with a quadratic term for the competition measure. The augmented model is thus specified as follows:
The relationship between credit risk and bank competition can then be summarized by:
For example, if we find that 1 < 0 and 2 > 0, there would be evidence of a Ushaped relationship between credit risk and bank competition (as measured inversely by the Lerner index). In such a case, at lower levels, increased competition would be associated with lower credit risks (competition-stability view). However, once a certain threshold of competition is reached, heightened competition would lead to higher credit risks (competition-fragility view).
Bank competition indicator
We decided to measure bank competition by the Lerner index which is a measure of a bank's market power and defined as the ratio between the mark-up (price minus 15 marginal cost) and price, and it should be zero in perfect competition but will increase in less competitive banking markets. By taking this measure, we make the assumption that there is a one-to-one mapping between market structure and competitive behaviour of banks: less competitive banking markets enhance market power and are associated with a higher Lerner index. The conventional form of Lerner index can be computed as follows:
where is the average price of the banking output of bank at time , and is the marginal cost. The price is measured by the implicit interest rate on loans (interest income divided by total loans), whereas banking output is measured by the stock of outstanding loans, as has been done in Solís and Maudos (2008), Williams (2012) and Lapteacru (2017) . Marginal costs are calculated via the estimation of the following trans-log cost function:
Total costs are measured by the sum of personnel expenses, other non-interest and interest expenses, output by total loans, and are three input prices (i.e., for labour, capital and funding). The price of labour is hereby measured by the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets, the price of physical capital by the ratio of other non-interest expenses to fixed assets, and the price for borrowed funds is measured by the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits and money market funding. We also include a time trend (T) and various interaction terms to control for unobserved determinants of total costs that are common to all banks over the time (such as technical progress) and other time-variant factors Fernández de Guevara, 2004, 2007; Turk Ariss, 2010) .
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The estimated coefficients of the total cost function are then applied to compute marginal cost: Koetter et al. (2012) argue that the conventional approach of computing the Lerner index fails to consider the possibility that banks may choose not to exploit pricing opportunities resulting from market power. It also assumes both profit and cost efficiencies. Consequently, if banks do not set their prices optimally and do not make optimal choices regarding their inputs, the conventional Lerner index would not measure correctly the true market power. In order to capture such effects, the authors suggest an adjustment in form of the efficiency-adjusted Lerner index:
where ̂ and ̂ are the predicted values of pre-tax profit and total cost, respectively, scaled by bank output (total loans). We estimate Equation (5) 
Other control variables
The net interest margin (NIM) is calculated as the ratio of gross interest and dividend income minus total interest expenses to total assets. The effect of the net interest margin on credit risks is ambiguous. On the one hand, higher margins could be an indication of higher credit risks, because they may point to banks that charge high interest rates due to a risky credit portfolio and/or the anticipation of losses (Angbazo, 1997; Maudos and Fernández de Guevara, 2004; Carbo and Rodriguez, 10 The adjusted version of the Lerner index has also been used by Clerides et al. (2015) , Kasman and Kasman (2015) and Lapteacru (2017). 2007). On the other hand, higher margins provide banks with an additional cushion to absorb adverse shocks, increase franchise values and thus lead to lower risktaking incentives.
Loan growth is considered as a major determinant of loan defaults (Podpiera and Weill, 2008, Jiménez and Saurina, 2006) . Rapid credit growth is not problematic in itself, especially in African countries where financial development is low and economic development may go hand in hand with strong credit growth. But excessive growth can result in a reduction of credit screening and monitoring quality, that subsequently increases the probability of loan defaults. We expect credit growth to positively affect credit risk. We use the loan-to-assets ratio to measure banks' credit growth history, as banks with larger loan portfolios are likely to have grown faster in the past, similar to Ghosh (2015) and Klein (2013) .
Income diversification is measured by non-interest income as a proportion of total assets. The relationship between non-performing loans and income diversification is not clear. Whereas Ghosh (2015) and Louzis et al. (2012) document that more diversification reduces risk and improves loan quality, Lepetit et al. (2008) point out that some banks may also neglect screening and monitoring of borrowers when focusing on non-banking activities.
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Capitalization is measured by the leverage ratio (total equity as a proportion of total assets), much like Louzis et al. (2012) , Klein (2013), and Zhang et al. (2016) . The impact of bank capitalization on credit risk is ambiguous. On the one hand, a higher capitalization may reflect that the bank is more risk averse and thus operates with higher capital buffers and potentially with less non-performing loans. On the other hand, higher capitalization may be an indication that a bank's regulatory capital 11 Also see Wagner (2010) .
18 requirements are high due to a riskier asset portfolio. Managers in banks with low equity ratios (high leverage) may have incentives to engage in riskier banking activities, while releasing expenses on credit scoring and the monitoring of borrowers (Keeton and Morris, 1987; Berger and DeYoung, 1997) .
Bank size (natural logarithm of total assets) is another potential determinant of credit risks. Salas and Saurina (2002) show that larger banks with more credit diversification opportunities can decrease the level of bad loans. Hu et al. (2004) argue that larger banks are in a better position to assess loan quality due to superior access to resources and economies of scale in information processing. The "too big to fail" hypothesis, on the other hand, highlights that larger banks may take more risks due to their implicit bail-out guarantee (Louzis et al., 2012; Brei and Gadanecz, 2012) , and they hence may operate with higher non-performing loan ratios.
In addition to the bank-specific variables, macroeconomic factors are likely influence non-performing loans. Following the current literature, we include real GDP growth to capture business cycle conditions and expect a negative relationship between economic activity and non-performing loans (Castro, 2013; Louzis et al., 2012; Salas and Saurina, 2002) . The impact of inflation is ambiguous (Klein, 2013) , as higher inflation reduces the real value of loans and can make debt servicing easier but also reduces the real income of borrowers, hence their ability to service debt. We also include public debt as a share of GDP (Louzis et al., 2012; Klein, 2013) . Public debt may positively affect non-performing loans both through expenditure (wage bill, investment) or revenue effects to soften fiscal deficits (Perotti, 1996) . In Sub-Saharan
African economies, where a high share of public receipts may depend on commodity price fluctuations, we expect a feedback loop between public revenue, spending and public debt on the one hand and defaults of both households and firms (through the accumulation or arrears for instance) on the other. institutions by using an indicator on the rule of law to capture the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, and the political and legal system (Kaufmann et al., 2011) .
Results
We estimate four separate models for non-performing loans. The first includes the bank-specific control variables and simple term of the adjusted Lerner index, the second in addition its square, and the third includes on top macroeconomic variables. The final specification incorporates all four sets of determinants: bank competition, bank-specific variables, macroeconomic and institutional indicators. The summary statistics for the regression variables are shown in Table 3 , and the regression results are reported in Table 4 .
In all of our models, the lagged dependent variable is significant, confirming the persistence of credit risk over time. This reflects that non-performing loans remain on the balance sheet for a certain time before they are written off. The Hansen test also validates the instruments used in all model specifications since we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are exogenous.
12 Economic concentration is a measure of the degree of product concentration provided by UNCTAD. An index value closer to 1 indicates that a country's trade sector is highly concentrated on a few products. On the contrary, values closer to 0 reflect diversification.
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In the linear specification I shown in Table 4 , a higher Lerner index (i.e. lower bank competition) is associated with better loan quality, giving support to the competition-fragility view. In specifications II, III and IV, the coefficient of the bank competition indicator is negative for the linear term but positive for the quadratic term and both coefficients are statistically significant. This implies that bank competition has been associated more bank stability, but only up to a certain threshold after which more competition has increased bank fragility in Sub-Saharan Leone, and Ethiopia recorded a higher market power than this threshold over the sample period (see Table 1 ), whereas the banks from the other countries faced higher competition.
Apart from the market power of banks, the only significant bank-specific determinant in Sub-Saharan Africa is the loan-to-assets ratio. Banks that are more involved in lending also report relatively more non-performing loans. This could be related to a high past growth of the loan book or lower screening standards due to 21 the relatively higher cost of borrower screening and monitoring compared to other types of investments. The coefficient of real GDP growth is negative as expected, confirming the impact of the business cycle on loan quality. Government debt is positively related to non-performing loans, suggesting a feedback loop between the fiscal stance of public sector, credit ratings for corporates, and credit risk. Economic concentration has an adverse effect on non-performing loans pointing to the vulnerability of highly concentrated economies to external shocks. There is no consensus in the empirical literature on the impact of foreign bank entry on stability. On the one hand, foreign banks might be a source of stability in periods of local stress by virtue of their geographic diversification and access to internal capital markets (Dages et al., 2000; Crystal et al., 2001; De Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2010) . Set against those benefits are fears of contagion from external crises, aggressive growth strategies, or the crowding-out of domestic lending to small firms (Peek an Rosengren, 2000; Clarke et al., 2005; Claessens and van Horen, 2012; De Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2014; Mian, 2006; Gormley, 2010; Chen et al., 2017) . The 22 results reported in columns V to VII of Table 5 suggest that in Sub-Saharan Africa foreign ownership (independent of the headquarters' origin) did not influence the Ushaped relationship between bank competition and credit risk.
Recent research also has focused on differences in the way private and state-owned banks may compete, a topic of interest in developing nations where state-owned institutions often hold substantial market shares. State-owned banks may have objectives other than profit maximization, such as fostering export, sectoral or regional development, or they may take into account lending externalities (Brei and Schclarek, 2015) . In addition to their impact on these market segments where lending can be unprofitable and risky, these institutions usually operate with government subsidies and may be subject to politically connected lending problems, reducing market discipline and the incentives of these to compete (Krueger, 1974; La Porta et al., 2002; Berger et al., 2004) . However, as has been highlighted in the literature this depends on the institutional background of a country (Adrianova et al., 2010) . As can be observed in column VIII of Table 5 , government ownership does not affect the relationship between competition and credit risk in Sub-Saharan Africa after controlling for the quality of public institutions.
The literature has also investigated the impact of bank size on competitive conditions. Relative to large banks, small banks in developed nations tend to serve smaller local customers and provide more retail-oriented financial services (DeYoung et al., 2004) . Banks of different sizes may also deliver their services using different technologies, with large banks developing costlier lending technologies (i.e. credit scoring) based on "hard" quantitative data, whereas small banks may rely more on technologies (i.e. relationship lending) based on "soft" information (Stein 2002) . As can be observed in column IX of Table 5 , we do not find evidence that the competition-stability relationship is affected by the relative size of the banks.
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The next set of regressions investigates the impact of external shocks on credit risks.
To this end, we include a variable identifying the global financial crisis (equal to one during 2008-10) and the commodity price shock of 2015 (equal to one in 2015). Our findings confirm the view that the African banking sector has been spared by the global financial crisis which might be due to the lower international exposure of local financial systems (Table 5 , column X), but it has been vulnerable to the recent reversal in commodity prices (Table5, column XI).
We also inspect the effect of financial development on loan quality by using a measure on financial depth (domestic credit to the private sector divided by GDP) and the number of bank branches that operate in a given country (as a financial inclusion measure). As suggested by Honohan and Beck (2007) , small financial systems are usually associated with inefficiencies in financial intermediation (e.g. due to high fixed costs). A more extensive coverage of bank branches helps reducing information asymmetries through better monitoring of borrowers. A large network of branches also provides better geographical coverage of banking services and thus diversification of local shocks, and it facilitates the transition from the informal to the formal sector. Our results indicate that both indicators reduce credit risks (Table 5, columns XII and XIII) suggesting that policies aimed at improving financial deepening and financial inclusion both lead to improvements in loan quality.
Finally, the literature has considered the regulatory framework as an important determinant of bank stability (e.g., Pagano, 1993, 2002; Houston et al. 2010 , Barth et al., 2013a Laeven and Levine, 2009) . As suggested by Pagano (1993, 2002) , information sharing among lenders attenuates the problems of information asymmetries, and can therefore increase lending activity and reduce default probabilities. In line with these studies, we investigate the impact of information sharing using data provided by the World Bank (Doing Business 24 database). 13 We find that credit bureau (registry) coverage is associated with lower credit risk in SSA (Table 5 , column XIV). This implies that loan quality is higher in countries where lenders share information, irrespective of the public or private character of the information sharing mechanism. Next, we use data provided by Barth et al. (2013) 14 and examine the impact of bank entry requirements and longer supervisor tenure on credit risk. 15 While bank entry requirements are not significant (Table5, column XV), longer supervisor tenure is associated with higher credit risk (Table5, column XVI). This result suggests a need to improve supervision quality, to the extent that supervisor mobility or turnover is an indicator of staff quality. Further research is however welcome to disentangle how the determinants of staff turnover (availability of staff and administrative capacity, experience and training, corruption)
interplay to justify this result.
Robustness checks
In this section, we discuss several tests applied to assess further robustness of our regression results. To test whether the results are biased by larger banking markets 16 , we excluded in our regressions Angola, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Tanzania, respectively. The results reported in Table 6 (columns XVII-XXI). The U-shaped relationship between bank competition and credit risk remains valid.
Second, we test whether the results are sensitive to the measure of bank competition and use the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). It is calculated by summing the 13 We measure information sharing by credit bureau (registry) coverage, which is defined as the number of individuals and firms listed in a credit bureau or registry. 14 Where yearly surveys are absent, we carried forward the values of the latest available data until the release of a subsequent survey (similar to Birchwood et al., 2017) . 15 "Bank entry requirements" is an index that ranges from 0 to 8 and a higher index value indicates greater stringency. "Longer supervisor tenure" is equal to 1 if the average tenure of current supervisors is greater than 10 years (which corresponds to the 75th percentile of distribution). 16 We consider as a larger banking sector, any market made up of more than 10 banks in our sample associated with total assets greater than 9 billion USD in 2015 (see Table 1 ).
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squares of the market share of each bank in a country's banking sector. 17 Two specifications are estimated, the first only includes the HHI and the second includes in addition its square. We find similar results as before on the U-shaped relationship between bank competition and credit risk (Table 6 , columns XXII and XXIII).
Third, we use two alternative measures of bank risk: (i) loan loss provisions as a ratio over total loans (Fungáčová and Weill, 2013; Beck et al., 2013b) and (ii) the Z-score (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Houston et al., 2010; Tabak et al., 2012; Chen et al. 2017 ).
The Z-score is a measure of overall bank risk and it captures how distant a particular bank is from insolvency. It is calculated as follows:
where denotes the return on assets of a bank (with the mean in the numerator), represents the ratio of total equity over total assets, and ( ) is the standard deviation of ROA. A higher score suggests a lower probability of bank insolvency. With implementation of both measures (using a 3-year rolling window to estimate the mean and standard deviation), the U-shaped relationship between credit risk and bank competition remains significant.
As outlined previously, competition affects credit risk through two channels:
operational efficiency and profitability. We assess the importance of these channels by replacing the dependent variable with a bank inefficiency indicator (non-interest expenses over total assets), and a profit margin measure (net income over total revenue). The results are reported in Table 7 . We also find a non-linear relationship between bank competition, inefficiency and profitability. More specifically, the findings suggests that an increase in competition initially increases bank profitability by efficiency gains associated with better practices (reduction in administrative 17 The database on the HHI was developed at the Banque de France using BankScope and Fitch Connect as well as reports from individual banks.
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expense, lower cost of borrower screening and monitoring). Above a certain threshold, however, further competition is associated with lower profit margins and higher inefficiencies enticing banks to engage in riskier activities.
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Conclusion
While this study mainly investigates the relationship between competition and credit risk, this paper sheds light on many other determinants of credit risk in Sub-Saharan Africa. Its results are thus both informative and important for policy makers concerned with financial stability in developing countries. We believe further research is needed to uncover credit risk determinants specific to developing countries, as well as macrofinancial (or prudential) regulations that will not hinder the financial development necessary for their economic development while ensuring the financial stability necessary to make it sustainable. The sample goes from 2000 to 2015. All estimations are based on the Arellano and Bover (1995) System GMM estimator. In columns (V)-(IX), the adjusted Lerner index is interacted with a dummy for foreign banks (all, Africa, developed countries), public banks, and bank size. The remaining columns include additional regressors in the baseline specification. (1) Reports p-values for the null hypothesis that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals. (2) Reports p-values for the null hypothesis that the errors in the first difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. (***, **, *) indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. Significant coefficients are in bold. The sample goes from 2000 to 2015. All estimations are based on the Arellano and Bover (1995) System GMM estimator. 'Exclude' indicates that regressions are done without banks from the particular country, 'HHI' indicates that the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is used as a measure for competition, 'Reserves' that reserves for problem loans and 'Z-Score' that the Z-Score is the dependent variable. (1) Reports p-values for the null hypothesis that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals. (2) Reports p-values for the null hypothesis that the errors in the first difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. (***, **, *) indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. Significant coefficients are in bold. GMM estimator. Efficiency indicator is measured by non-interest expense as a proportion of total assets. We reach to the same results by using cost-income ratio as an alternative measure of bank efficiency. Profitability is measured by the ratio of net income to total banks' revenue. We also use return on equity and the results remain valid.
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(1) Reports p-values for the null hypothesis that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals.
(2) Reports p-values for the null hypothesis that the errors in the first difference regression exhibit no secondorder serial correlation. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. (***, **, *) indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. Significant coefficients are in bold.
